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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
BENJAMIN BOONE NEAL,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45372
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CR42-16-9994

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a guilty plea, Benjamin Boone Neal was sentenced to a unified term of ten
years, with three years determinate, for the crime of felony Operating a Vehicle While Under the
Influence of Alcohol (“DUI”), in violation of I.C. § 18-8004, after having been previously
convicted of a felony DUI within the past fifteen years, I.C. § 18-8005(9). Mr. Neal thereafter
filed a timely appeal, followed by a Motion to Reduce Sentence pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule
35, which was denied. On appeal, Mr. Neal asserts the trial court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence and denying his Rule 35 motion to reduce the same.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceeding
On September 27, 2016, in the early evening hours, Mr. Neal was driving on his way
home when he ran into a vehicle at an intersection in Twin Falls. The police were called to the
scene, whereupon Mr. Neal admitted consuming alcohol. A sample of Mr. Neal’s blood was
taken, confirming he was over the legal limit with a blood alcohol concentration of .22.
(R. p.13.) He was arrested and charged with Operating a Vehicle while Under the Influence of
Alcohol and/or an Intoxicating Substance, while having been previously convicted of DUI within
the past fifteen years, I.C. §§ 18-8004; 8005(9). (R. pp.45-47.) He pled guilty as charged.
(Tr. pp.9, Ls.3-25; p.10, Ls.1-21.)
At the August 3, 2017, sentencing hearing, the State requested a ten-year term, four years
fixed, with retained jurisdiction and a rider. (Tr. p.7, Ls.17-19.) The Presentence Investigator
also recommended that Mr. Neal participate in a rider. (Presentence Investigation Report
(“PSI”), p.14.)1 Through counsel, Mr. Neal argued for probation through a problem-solving
court, and highlighted the initiative he took by proactively seeking intensive treatment at the
Veterans Clinic and Valley Community Counseling. (Tr. p.10, Ls.18-24; p.17, Ls.11-13.)
Despite these requests, the district court imposed an excessive prison sentence of ten years, with
three years fixed, as well as $25,898.48 in restitution (for the damaged vehicle), and a mandatory
five-year license suspension.

(R. pp.177-181.)

Mr. Neal thereafter filed a timely appeal.

(R. pp.189-192.)
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Mr. Neal refers to PSI dated July 23, 2017, prepared for sentencing in this matter.
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On November 27, 2017, Mr. Neal also filed a Motion to Reduce Sentence under Rule 35
requesting leniency, based upon a totality of the circumstances.2 Mr. Neal supported his motion
with a November 15, 2017, letter he wrote to the court, excerpts from the sentencing hearing
transcript, a letter from the U.S. Department of Veteran’s Affairs, and a letter from a former
employer. The trial court denied the motion.

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years,
with three years fixed, and a mandatory five-year driver’s license suspension, following
Mr. Neal’s guilty plea to a second felony DUI?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Neal’s Idaho Criminal Rule
35 Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of the additional information submitted by
Mr. Neal?

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten Years,
With Three Years Fixed, Following Mr. Neal’s Guilty Plea To A Second Felony DUI
Mr. Neal asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten years, with
three years fixed, and an absolute five-year driver’s license suspension, is excessive. Mr. Neal
does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show
an abuse of discretion, Mr. Neal must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707
(Ct. App. 1982). Where a defendant contends the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
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Mr. Neal simultaneously filed a Motion to Augment the record with the November 27, 2017,
Motion to Reduce, and the December 1, 2017, Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, and
hereby incorporates the Rule 35 denial in his appeal.
3

sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). “Reasonableness is a
fundamental requirement in the exercise of sentencing discretion.” State v. Kingsley, 99 Idaho
868, 869, 590 P.2d 1014, 1015 (1979). Yet, unless it appears that confinement was necessary “to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case, a sentence is
unreasonable.” Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568. In this case, Mr. Neal’s sentence is unreasonable and
excessive because the district court failed to properly balance the numerous mitigating factors
and fashion a sentence that would fulfill the goals of sentencing.
The mitigating factors in Mr. Neal’s case included his acceptance of responsibility,
amenability to treatment, prior successful performance on probation, character, and community
support. To begin with, Mr. Neal willingly entered a plea to the crime instead of litigating this
matter at trial. (R. p.47.) During his colloquy with the court, Mr. Neal apologized to the victim
and understood the ramifications of his actions:
I would like to formally apologize to Mrs. Remaley. I’m really, really sorry and
I’m sorry for your loss. My decisions put her and the community in serious
danger. I fully understood my addiction to alcohol and all the negative impacts
it’s brought. I’m committed with all my heart to a sober life. I’ve entered into
treatment programs and counseling. The support I get from my wife and my
family and counselors is helping me become the man I want to be.
Having the love of my wife has given me the direction and the drive that I haven’t
had in a long time. Her safety and happiness and building a family and future is
the most important thing to me and alcohol is no part of that future. I will never
again be a danger to this or any community. I know I’m not in a position to ask
for anything, I just ask that I am able to continue with my treatment and recovery
so that I can stay and support my wife.
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(Tr. p.24, L.11 – p.25, Ls.1, 3.) Acknowledgement of guilt and acceptance of responsibility by
the defendant are critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815
(Ct. App. 2010). Mr. Neal’s insight into his condition and his eagerness to participate in
treatment were positive indicators supporting his ability to comply with probation.
Mr. Neal was successful on his first felony grant of probation, between the years of 2008
and 2011, in Twin Falls County Court Case No. CR 2007-10481. He had no issues. (PSI, p.6.)
Mr. Neal explained, however, that during a particularly stressful time when he lost his house and
filed for bankruptcy, he succumbed to his alcoholism and drank again. (PSI, p.10.) Courts have
recognized that substance abuse can be a mitigating factor in sentencing. State v. Nice, 103
Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982). Since the arrest in September 2017, however, he embarked upon
an intensive treatment plan and has relapsed only once. (PSI, p.10.) Mr. Neal is very dedicated
to his sobriety and his amenability to treatment should be considered a mitigating factor. See,
e.g., State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). After the current offense, Mr. Neal
took initiative and returned for counseling and treatment to the Veteran’s Clinic. (PSI, p.11.) He
began working with Kirk Hazen. Mr. Hazen described Mr. Neal’s participation:
He is an active participant in the groups and seems to be very receptive to
feedback in both group and individual sessions. We have covered several topics
including how to manage and eliminate stress, active listening versus defensive
communication skills, and the problem-solving process as part of his alcohol
abstinence program. He has been diligent on completing all assigned homework.
Given my observations over the past several months, my prognosis is positive at
this time.
PSI, pp.11, 34.) Mr. Neal also started classes for substance abuse disorder treatment at Valley
Community Counseling in November, 2016, and had already completed the intensive outpatient
and relapse prevention programs by the time of his sentencing. He had yet to finish the CBI-SA
component of class. Staff there wrote:
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Throughout the program Benjamin [Mr. Neal] has consistently attended all
required classes and appointments. He has never once had an unexcused absence.
Benjamin participates in classroom discussions and completes homework
assignments. He often reports using the skills he is learning in class and
counseling to avoid using drugs or alcohol.
(PSI, p.32.) His progress was corroborated by Tiffany Hall of the Twin Falls Court Compliance
Program, and well as the GAIN evaluator, who recommended Level I outpatient treatment. (PSI,
pp.6, 13, 23.) According to the Presentence Investigator, his LSI-R was only 10, based upon
Mr. Neal’s good use of time, accommodations, financial stability, employment, pro-social
outlook and family support. This low LSI-R placed him in the low risk category. (PSI, p.12.)
Thus, Mr. Neal’s amenability to treatment and his prior success on probation were good
indicators that a probation sentence was warranted.
Mr. Neal also has a strong character and a lot of community support. He graduated from
high school and served in the Air Force for three years and eight months as an In-Flight
Refueling Journeyman between 1996 and 1999. (PSI, pp.7-8.) His military service is mitigating.
See State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982) (reducing sentence of defendant who, inter alia, “had
received an honorable discharge from the Air Force”); See also State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115,
118 (1955) (finding that it was error for court to fail to consider, inter alia, a defendant’s military
service, which included two separate enlistments, when determining the appropriate sentence).
Mr. Neal is also self-supporting and has held down long-term employment in the past. At the
time of sentencing, Mr. Neal was working at Chobani and with his mother as a tile setter. (PSI,
p.9.) Thus, he has the capacity and willingness to pay the restitution to the victim in this case.
(Tr. p.24, Ls.11-25; p.25, Ls.1-3.) His recent marriage to his wife, Irene, provides a great
incentive to remain sober and healthy, and be a productive member of society. (PSI, p.8.) He
has outside interests, engaging in hobbies such as fishing and hiking, and attending self-help
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groups and church. (PSI, p.7.) At the time of sentencing, he was living at his mother’s house,
from whom he both received and gave support. Nancy Brown, his mother, described her son as a
peacemaker, easy-going, and artistic. (PSI, pp.30-31.) She explained that he has been doing as
much counseling as his job would permit, his “goals have taken a more meaningful turn,” he
helps her with her business, and had recently set some high goals for himself and his family. She
requested that the court place her son in Veteran’s Court. (PSI, pp.30-31.) All of these factors
revealed Mr. Neal’s commitment to change and his solid support in the community.
In sum, when the district court imposed a unified ten-year term, rejecting even the
prosecutor’s request for a rider, it failed to “balance the goals of retribution, protection of society
and deterrence against the defendant's potential for rehabilitation.” State v. Douglas, 118 Idaho
622, 624, 798 P.2d 467, 469 (Ct. App. 1990). Mr. Neal presented significant and compelling
mitigation by way of his self-initiated entry into treatment, his remorse, his prior success on
felony probation, and his stability, including prior military service and community support.
Mr. Neal presented a minimal risk to the community and he had already been deterred from
committing future criminal acts. The trial court simply failed to fully consider Mr. Neal’s
zealous rehabilitative activities and chances for success on probation. Moreover, by imposing an
absolute five year driver’s license suspension when only one year was mandated by statute, the
district court also failed to fully take into consideration the goal of restitution, which is best met
by a defendant who can independently transport himself to and from employment. I.C. § 188005(6); I.C. § 19-2521(2) (“The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the
court, shall be accorded weight in favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment: . . . (f) The
defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his criminal conduct for the damage
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or injury that was sustained; provided, however, nothing in this section shall prevent the
appropriate use of imprisonment and restitution in combination . . . .”).
Given that the primary sentencing consideration is the good order and protection of
society, Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568, probation was warranted here to afford Mr. Neal the ability to
continue employment, pay restitution, and further his treatment through Valley Community
Counseling, the Veteran’s Clinic and Veteran’s Court.

As such, the trial court abused its

discretion by imposing an excessive sentence because it was above and beyond that necessary for
the protection of society. Accordingly, it should be amended to reflect probation and a short
license suspension.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Neal’s Rule 35
Motion To Reduce Sentence In Light Of New Information Offered
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994), citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447
(Ct. App. 1984). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same
as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Lopez, 106 Idaho
at 450. The burden is on the appellant to show how the sentence is excessive based upon new or
additional information submitted since the original hearing. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Here, Mr. Neal’s sentence was excessive in light of new
documentation revealing his progress towards rehabilitation and community support upon
release.
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To augment the mitigating evidence before the court at the original sentencing, Mr. Neal
submitted additional documentation to support his Rule 35 motion. (See Motion to Augment,
Exhibit A.) Mr. Neal included a personal letter requesting rehabilitative efforts through retained
jurisdiction, or a reduction of his fixed term so that he could qualify for work release. He
described how the time spent in prison thus far has allowed him opportunity for self-reflection.
He fully recognizes the impact his intoxicated driving had on Ms. Remaley and the community.
He pledged to live his life with honestly, integrity and sobriety. Id.
Mr. Neal also submitted new information regarding his post-sentencing efforts, which
included regular attendance at AA meetings and the facility’s grant of work approval, permitting
Mr. Neal to deliver furniture in the community for Correctional Industries. (See Motion to
Augment, Exhibit A.) The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs also confirmed that Mr. Neal is
eligible to receive physical and mental health treatment through the local medical center,
assuring the trial court that Mr. Neal has resources to meet his needs. Moreover, Mr. Neal has
the ability to maintain stable, long term employment, as evidenced by Mr. Trappen, President of
Arco Company, Inc.’s, letter of support describing Mr. Neal as an exemplary and dedicated
employee. (Motion to Augment, Exhibit A.) His stellar performance warrants recognition and
bodes well for his ability to comply with supervision requirements. This additional information
demonstrates Mr. Neal’s previously imposed sentence is harsher than necessary to achieve the
primary goals of sentencing because Mr. Neal has already been punished through months in
custody, has demonstrated his moral and ethical rehabilitation, and has presented corroboration
that he is such a low risk to the community that he was awarded a job in the community through
the prison.
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Beyond this new information rendering Mr. Neal’s sentence unduly harsh, Mr. Neal’s
counsel also raised the possibility that the trial court misunderstood the sentencing
recommendation of the prosecution, and imposed a more excessive sentence than intended. (See
Motion to Reduce, pp.2-4.) Specifically, the transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates the
prosecutor recommended a ten year term, with four years fixed, and retained jurisdiction.
However, when the trial court issued its ruling, it stated, “I think one of the goals of sentencing is
not to impose a greater sentence than the minimum required and that’s why I’ve only given you
three years fixed. I thought about more: Four years as the state recommends, five years, higher.”
(Tr., p.33, Ls.2-6.) (emphasis added.)

Since the trial court referenced the State’s

recommendation without denoting the State’s simultaneous request for a rider, instead stating it
was imposing a lighter sentence, it is plausible the court did not accurately hear or understand
the prosecution’s sentencing recommendation. Upon Mr. Neal’s emphasis on this fact in his
Rule 35 motion, the trial court failed to fully consider and address this potential error in its
Order.
Upon review of the trial court’s denial of Mr. Neal’s Rule 35 motion, the Court now must
consider the entire record, including the new information submitted. See State v. Carter, 157
Idaho 900, 903, 341 P.3d 1269, 1272 (Ct. App. 2014); See also, State v. Edghill, 155 Idaho 846,
852, 317 P.3d 743, 749 (Ct. App. 2014) (finding trial court erred for failing to consider both
provisions of a driver’s license suspension when evaluating defendant’s sentence for vehicular
manslaughter). Mr. Neal presented compelling new information demonstrating his great efforts
towards rehabilitation, his ability to interact peacefully in the community, and his identification
of significant community resources, such that a three year fixed sentence was no longer
necessary to protect society, provide rehabilitation, and exact punishment. Based upon the
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foregoing, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to properly balance this new
information and denied his Rule 35.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Neal respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing or
Rule 35 hearing.
DATED this 8th day of February, 2018.

___________/s/______________
LARA E. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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